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Force-dynamic cultural models in a scalar adjectival construction
(manuscript – talk given at UK-CLC5, Lancaster University, july/August 2014)
Kim Ebensgaard Jensen, Aalborg Universitet
1. Introduction
The English [too ADJ to V]-construction is best described as involving an implied force-dynamic
relation (cp. Bergen & Binsted’s (2004) notion of an implied pragmatic relationship) between the
ADJ- and V-elements (Fortuin 2013, 2014; Jensen 2013, 2014), as seen below :
(1) The tatty furniture betrayed elegant lines, and the windows, too grimy to see through,  
stretched up ten feet. (COCA 2011 FIC Bk:NeverGentleman)
(2) They’re too slow to catch a seal in open water. (COCA 2011 MAG NationalGeographic)
(3) If the making of a revolution is drama, punctuated with tragedies too numerous to count, 
making peace is  long-form prose requiring iterations of  conversation between people.  
(COCA 2011 MAG TechReview)
Reporting on a general corpus-study of the construction, Jensen (2013) suggests that it is a scalar
adjectival  construction  in  which  the  presence  of  too,  a  booster-type  degree  modifier  (Paradis
200:149), specifies such a high degree of  ADJNESS – that is, whatever attribute the ADJ-element
expresses – that it is construed as having a preventive effect on the situation expressed by the V-
element. In his work on the same construction, Fortuin (2013) calls this function EXCESS, as the high
degree of  ADJNESS exceeds a maximum degree of appropriateness for the situation predicated by
the infinitive clause (see Fortuin 2013: 35 for the full definition of the EXCESS concept). Thus, it is
the force-dynamic image schema of  BLOCKAGE (Johnson 1987: 45-46) that constitutes the implied
force-dynamic relation. This should be quite clear in examples (1-3) above, in which there is a
‘natural’ relation of prevention between the attribute expressed by the ADJ-element and the event
expressed by the V-element. Now, consider the following examples:
(4) She felt she was too young to marry. (COCA 2010 FIC Bk:ClassTrip.
(5) Danes will be far too polite to laugh at you. (COCA 2011 NEWS Denver)
(6) Mr. Turman insisted he was too busy to meet at any other time. (COCA 2011 NEWS  
NYTimes)
While  (1-3)  reflect  perceptions  of  ‘natural’ force-dynamic  relations,  (4-6)  appear  to  draw  on
culturally  defined  force-dynamic  relations.  This  seems  to  indicate  an  interaction  between  the
constructional semantics underlying cultural models (Holland & Quinn 1987, Ungerer & Schmid
2006: 51-59) of force-dynamics or causation (d’Andrade 1987: 117-118).
Applying covarying collexeme analysis  (Stefanowitsch & Gries 2004),  the present study
investigates collexeme combinations in the [too ADJ to V]-construction in Davies (2014) Corpus of
Contemporary American English (or  COCA) in order to see how force-dynamic cultural models
emerge in the discursive behaviour of the construction. Taking into account the relations between an
individual linguistic unit and that discourse in which it occurs, we can assume that, if a construction
in discourse is reflective of a cultural model, there should also be access points to the same model in
the discursive context. Therefore, we are also going to have a brief look at the interaction between
instances of the construction and their co-text in specific usage-events with a view to identifying co-
textual cultural model cues.
This  paper  is  structured as  follows.  In  section 2,  we will  address the notion of cultural
models, offering a definition that generalizes over definitions offered within cognitive anthropology,
cognitive linguistics, and intercultural communication studies. Section 3 offers a brief account of
the data and method used, while section 4 discusses three specific instantiations of the construction
– namely [too young to V], [too polite to V], and [too busy to V] – and how they appear to draw on
cultural models of age, politeness, and being busy. Finally, in section 5, we discuss role of co-text in
relation to constructions and cultural models.
2. Cultural models
Cultural  models  are  defined  by  Quinn  &  Holland  (1987:4)  as  cognitive  structures  that  are
“presupposed, taken for granted models of the world that are widely shared … by members of a
society and that play an enormous role in their understanding of the world and their behavior in it”.
In that sense, they are both social and cognitive, constituting the encyclopedic knowledge of the
world associated with the worldview of a community.
The notion of cultural models is not particularly widespread in cognitive-linguistic analysis,
where the term ‘(idealized) cognitive model’ is more prevalent. However, with the emergence of
cognitive sociolinguistics (e.g.  Kronenfeld 2014; Schneider 2014) and the increasing interest  in
socio-cultural  aspects  of  language  and  cognition  within  cognitive  linguistics  (e.g.  Croft  2009;
Harder  2010),  it  is  not  unlikely  that  we  will  encounter  the  concept  of  cultural  models  more
frequently in cognitive-linguistic work in the future.
2.1 What is a cultural model?
Naturally, cultural model theory constitutes a rather complex area, and it would be impossible to do
full justice to it in a paper like the one at hand. However, I think it is safe to say that most scholars
in the field would agree that the following five generalizations are applicable:
(a) cultural models are schematic cognitive models, which involve universal cognitive structural
principles and processes (Rice 1980: 154);
(b) cultural  models  are  intersubjectively shared in  a  community and thus  culturally specific
(D’Andrade 1987: 112; Ungerer & Schmid 2006: 51);
(c) cultural  models are  presumed by the members of the community to be intersubjectively
shared (D’Andrade 1987: 113);
(d) cultural  models  guide  the  community members’ understanding  of  the  world  and  people
(Quinn & Holland 1987:4; Kronenfeld 2008: 69);
(e) cultural models are behavior-mediating and behavior-regulating (Fryberg & Markus 2007:
215).
Points (a) and (b) may initially appear to be mutually contradictory. Whereas Ungerer & Schmid
(2006: 51) stress the culture-specificity of cultural models, Rice points out that (1980: 154), while
culturally  specific,  cultural  models  draw  on  universal  cognitive  organizational  principles  and
universal cognitive processes.  In all  fairness, Ungerer & Schmid (2006: 51-52) do suggest that
cultural models and cognitive models are two sides of the same coin, with the former term capturing
the  socio-cultural  nature  of  this  type  of  cognitive  phenomenon and capturing  its  psychological
nature.
Implicit  in  point  (b)  is  also  that  cultural  models  constitute  the  common  ground  of  a
community.  The  taken-for-granted  nature  of  cultural  models  is  captured  by  point  (c).  The
presumption of shared intersubjectivity in a community rests on our awareness of other minds and
the knowledge (or assumption) that other people also know what you know (D’Andrade 1987: 113).
Another important factor is conventionalization, or standardization:
When we do anything with others, including talking (!), it  is necessary to interrelate our
separate cognitive structures; and when we routinely do something with a variety of others we will
tend to develop some standardized way of doing it – where “standardized” refers to categories of
actions, items, acceptable result, and so forth. These shared action plans emerge as cultural models.
(Kronenfeld 2008:71-72)
Cultural models thus emerge as standardized categories of experiences within a community.
Moreover, due to their intersubjective nature, cultural models are acquired socially-experientially
via what D’Andrade (1981: 182) calls “repeated social transmission”. That is, by repetition, cultural
models are entrenched in the members of the community in question, following the principles of
distributed cognition (Kronenfeld 2014).
Kronenfeld’s (2008:71-72) description of cultural models as shared action plans leads us to
points (d) and (e). I would contend that not necessarily all cultural models are action plans per se.
However, cultural models – by virtue of being entrenched schemata based on repeated experiences
(or distributed transmissions thereof) – inevitably  become reality to the community in question.
Consequently,  its  members’  perception  of  the  world  will  typically  be  filtered  through  their
worldview and the cultural models that it consists of. Naturally, people’s behavior is adjusted to
their  perception  of  the  world,  and  the  members’ behavior  will  typically  be  informed  by their
intersubjectively shared cultural models. We see this in, for instance, superstitions which often draw
on various force-dynamic image schemata (Johnson 1987: 42-48; see also Talmy 2000: 409-470).
Causal  superstitions,  for  example,  build  on  the  underlying  force-dynamic  image  schema  of
COMPULSION (Johnson 1987: 45), such that  IF SITUATION P  HAPPENS,  THEN SITUATION Q  INVARIABLY
FOLLOWS.  An example of a causal superstition is  BLACK CATS BRING BAD LUCK in which,  if  you
encounter a black cat, it invariably causes you to experience bad luck. Such superstitions typically
have no objective truth to them, but many people still behave as if they were true. For example,
people might be inclined to avoiding black cats, and this often in spite of people knowing that there
is no truth to this superstition (Watzlawik 2013:513).
As it happens, causal superstitions are instances of force-dynamic cultural models: cultural
models  in  which  a  force-dynamic  image  schema  plays  a  pivotal  role.  Force-dynamic  cultural
models  are  perceptions  of  force-dynamic  relations  that  are  entrenched within  a  community.  Of
course, they need not be superstitious, but they are typically idealized to a large extent and typically
more based on cultural values than on actual force-dynamic relations.
Readers are referred to the following for more on cultural model theory and its application in
analysis of cultural and communicative phenomena and social behavior: Rice (1980), D’Andrade
(1981, 1987), Holland & Skinner (1987), Keesing (1987), Quinn (1987), Quinn & Holland (1987),
Sweetser  (1987),  Li  et  al.  (2004),  Gries  &  Stefanowitsch  (2004),  Ungerer  &  Schmid  (2006),
Fryberg & Markus (2007), Kronenfeld (2008, 2014), and Schneider (2014).
2.2 Cultural models, verbal behavior, and corpus data
If cultural models are behavior-regulating, then behavior is also reflective of cultural models. This
includes  verbal  behavior,  and  cognitive  anthropologists  generally  analyze  verbal  behavior  to
identify  underlying  cultural  models.  Interestingly,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  studies  (e.g.
Stefanowitsch  &  Gries  2004),  language  corpora  and  corpus  methodology  are  rare  among  the
techniques  used in  the analysis  of cultural  models and their  reflection in  verbal  behavior,  with
interviews and experimental verbal tasks being preferred.
Of course, there are several studies in corpus linguistics that address and reveal states-of-
affairs in cultural space (e.g. Leech & Fallon 1992; Ooi 2000; Elsness 2013). Thus, corpus data and
methodology have proven valuable in the analysis of the language-culture interrelation. I would
contend that, since language corpora document verbal behavior in a naturalistic setting, corpus data
and methodology – as Stefanowitsch & Gries (2004) have already shown – can be used more
specifically in the study of the relation between verbal behavior and cultural models.
3. Data and method
The data were retrieved from the 464,020,256-word  COCA (Davies 2014). Consequently, we are
focusing on cultural models in American culture. Using COCA’s built-in concordancer, and having
weeded out non-instances, 19,525 instances of the construction were retrieved. It should be noted
that, because the mark-up of primary verbs in COCA is not optimal. I have left out instances were
the primary verbs appear in the V-position. Consequently, some potentially important information is
left out. Ideally, primary verbs should be put into the equation eventually, but this would require a
re-annotation procedure first in which a distinction is made between auxiliary and main verb uses.
Similarly, cases where the infinitive V-clause is negates, as in The construction was too interesting
not to study are also left out. The justification for doing this is that there is a chance that [ too ADJ
not to V] may be a  constructional  exemplar  in  its  own right,  and including it  might  skew the
analysis to some extent.
Using, Gries (2007), the 19,525 instances were subjected to a co-varying collexeme analysis
(Gries  &  Stefanowitsch  2004,  Stefanowitsch  &  Gries  2005),  which  is  a  corpus-based
collostructional  analysis  that  measures  the  degree  of  coattraction  between  the  lexemes  in  two
schematic  positions  a  construction.  Covarying  collexeme analysis  is  based  on  the  principle  of
semantic coherence (Stefanowitsch & Gries 2005: 11), according to which we can expect lexical
items in a construction to display a relation of mutual semantic coherence. A fundamental principle
of  collostructional  analysis  is  that  canonical  instances  of  lexeme-construction  relations  involve
semantic  compatibility between the lexeme and the construction,  and,  in the case of covarying
collexemes, the relation of semantic coherence is typically compatible with the semantic relation
between  the  positions  in  the  construction  in  which  the  collexemes  occur.  Thus,  by  measuring
coattracted items in a construction, we may identify aspects of the semantic relations between the
two positions in the construction. In this study, then, we measure the coattraction between ADJ- and
V-elements.  The  degree  of  coattraction  is  referred  to  as  collostruction  strength  (abbreviated
‘Coll.strength’ in tables in this paper) and is based on a  p-value generated in a Fisher Test or a
similar statistical test on the basis of the following four frequencies: the first lexeme in one position
in the construction, all other lexemes in the same position, the second lexeme in the other position
in the construction, and all other lexemes in the other position in the construction. This is applied to
every lexeme in the construction. In the present study, log-likelihood is applied, as it allows for
somewhat  more  fine-grained  distinctions  between  the  most  strongly  coattracted  items  in  a
construction than the plain Fisher Test does. Covarying collexeme analysis produces a ranked list of
pairs of coattracted lexemes in the construction, which based on collostruction strength: the higher
the score, the stronger the relation of coattraction.
4. Cultural models of AGE, POLITENESS, and BEING BUSY
In the following, we are going to focus on the covarying collexeme attraction patterns in three
instantiations of the construction – namely [too young to V], [too polite to V], and [too busy to V].
While  there  are  other  instantiations,  in  which  force-dynamic  cultural  models  emerge  in  the
discursive behavior associated with the construction, these three have been chosen because they are
expressive of contents that are quite obviously interlinked with behavior, interpersonal relations,
and cultural values.
4.1 [Too young to V] and cultural models of AGE
Quinn & Holland (1987:4) and Kronenfeld (2008: 69) point out that cultural models serve to help
members of a community make sense of other people’s behaviour. In light of this, it is likely that
people assign causality to the behavior of other people as a way to make sense of, and identify
patterns,  in their  behavior.  AGE is  often assigned significance within cultures,  in  the sense that
certain types of activities are often considered appropriate for or typical of some age ranges and
inappropriate for and typical of other age ranges. For instance, it is typically inappropriate for adults
to play with toys, and children are not expected to discuss politics. Thus, we can expect [too young
to V] to be reflective of force-dynamic cultural models of AGE in which YOUNGNESS is construed as
being preventive of the activity expressed by the verb-element.
As  may  be  expected,  young occurs  with  drink,  drive,  vote,  enlist,  and  testify which  reflects
underlying cultural patterns of behavior relating to  AGE, ultimately governed by legal restrictions,
such that a MINIMUM AGE is imposed upon certain activities. In the construction, too young construes
a degree of YOUNGNESS that exceeds the MINIMUM AGE specified by the legal restrictions in question
and prevents the activity from taking place.
What may be particularly striking is that  young appears to attract verbs of  COGNITION and
EVALUATION, such as  know,  remember,  understand,  recall,  appreciate,  realize,  comprehend,  learn,
recollect,  question,  grasp,  evaluate,  process,  and  recognize.  This  may  indicate  an  underlying
perception of a causal relation between AGE and INTELLECT in American culture where YOUNG AGE
has a preventive effect on INTELLECTUAL CAPACITY. Below are five examples:
(7) At 14, Jamie Fleming should be too young to know about guns or any of the specific  
details of violence and perversity that fill his mind – and, he says, his memory. (COCA 
1993 SPOK CBS_EyeToEye)
(8) “My compliments to the host,” I said, hoping she wasn’t too young to understand irony. 
But she shoved the bottle back to me, her mask swiveling to the left. “I can’t take that,” 
she said, her voice carrying more than a trace of alarm. “Someone might think you’re  
trying to bribe me.” (COCA 2005 FIC Analog)
(9) AT FIFTEEN,  BILL JOHNSON was  really  too  young  to  comprehend  the  danger  of  
frostbite. (COCA 1997 MAG FieldStream)
(10) It was later on, when he grew up, that he began to think back and ask the questions his son  
now asked him. At the time of the heroic deed he was too young to grasp the real danger 
implicit in that challenge, but his father was no child. How could he have imperiled his  
son’s life without shaking at all? (COCA 2011 FIC MassachRev)
(11) Of course the juvenile justice system does occasionally deal with children too young to  
appreciate the moral dimensions or real-world consequences of their behavior... (COCA 
1998 ACAD CATOJournal)
In conjunction with the examples in (7-11), the table not only suggests a  force-dynamic cultural
models in which  YOUNG AGE has a preventive effect on cognitive activity, but a rather complex
network of force-dynamic cultural models of  AGE in which  YOUNG AGE prevents various types of
intellect- and morality-based activity and behavior seems to emerge. This network may be encoded
by a more or less conventionalized [too young to VCOGNITION]-schema. Moreover, as seen in (7-11), the
force-dynamic relation of  YOUNG AGE BLOCKING INTELLECTUAL CAPACITY is applied in a myriad of
different ways, depending on the immediate linguistic context. Thus, [too young to VCOGNITION] enters
into reciprocal specificational relationship with other elements in the textual context. It is likely that
there is semantic coherence throughout the entire stretch of discourse that relates to the instance of
[too young to VCOGNITION] in question. For example, a formulation like *At 31, he was too young to
understand love would be semantically odd, while  At 31,  he was too young to understand the
traumas that Vietnam veterans must live with would be semantically acceptable.
4.2 [Too polite to V] and cultural models of POLITENESS
POLITENESS, like AGE, is a concept tied in with socio-cultural values. More specifically, POLITENESS
draws  on  cultural  models  of  FACE NEGOTIATION IN INTERPERSONAL ENCOUNTERS.  Looking  at  the
collexemes of polite in [too ADJ to V] may thus provide us with an insight into the types of actions
that are considered face-threatening in the cultural model of POLITENESS in American culture.
There is an abundance of verbs of COMMUNICATION and other ACTS OF INTERPERSONAL INTERACTION,
such  as  point  (out),  ask,  add,  disagree,  inquire,  comment,  mention,  object,  question,  complain,
express,  protest,  tell, and  speak. Below are three examples of usage-events in which such verbs
appear opposite polite in the construction:
(12) He  didn’t  know my name  either  and  had  been  too  polite  to  ask.  (COCA 1993  FIC  
Bk:PatronSaintLiars)
(13) You’ll probably want to explain the birthmark to your friends who are too polite to mention
it,  but you’re not obliged to say anything to strangers who stare.  (COCA 2007 MAG  
Parenting)
(14) I told them about Henry Dawes and John Collier in return, but maybe they knew about  
them already and were too polite to tell me. (COCA 1998 ACAD AmerIndianQ)
This suggests a possibly conventionalized [too polite to VINTERACTION]-schema which encodes certain
aspects of the American POLITENESS cultural model. More specifically, these findings indicate that,
in this cultural model certain acts of communication and interaction may be considered particularly
face-threatening in  a  number of  situational  contexts.  Thus,  the [too polite  to VINTERACTION]  schema
encodes the types of interactive actions that are considered face-threatening in the model, and, as
the  examples  above  illustrate,  the  co-text  may  specify  the  situational  context  in  which  the
interaction types are face-threatening. The examples in (12) and (14), which are representative of
many cases of [too polite to VINTERACTION] in COCA, indicate that the situational context itself has to do
with access to information and knowledge. In (12), for instance, the other interlocutor’s ignorance
of  the  narrator’s  name is  construed as  face-threatening to  the  narrator,  and the  high  degree  of
politeness  assigned  to  the  other  interlocutor’s  character  prevents  him from actually  asking  the
narrator’s name. In (14), it is the speaker’s lack of knowledge that his or her fellow interlocutors
already have  access  to  the  information  that  the  speaker  conveyed  which  is  construed as  face-
threatening, thus preventing – according to the speaker’s speculation – the other interlocutors from
letting the interlocutor know.
Example (13)  represents another  typical  situational  context  of  [too polite  to VINTERACTION]  –
namely that of taboo. It is safe to say that in most western cultures, physical deformity is considered
taboo, and it is particularly impolite to talk about it in the presence of the person who suffers from
the deformity or of people who are close to this person. This is probably because talking about the
deformity is considered face-threatening to the person, or people, in question. Now, at first thought,
a birthmark may not seem to qualify as a physical deformity. However, the full discursive context of
the example in (13), rendered as (15) below, reveals that this is a particularly large and notable
birthmark:
(15) Q: My baby has a birthmark on her face that people notice and even ask about. How should
I answer?
A: For sure, when you see someone ogling your baby, your instinct is to do whatever it  
takes to get that person to stop. But people are going to stare, and even ask questions, not 
out of malice but from simple human curiosity. So just try to answer as briefly and matter-
of-factly as you can (“Yes, it’s a birthmark, and it doesn’t hurt her at all”), and move on. 
You’ll probably want to explain the birthmark to your friends who are too polite to mention
it, but you’re not obliged to say anything to strangers who stare. You don’t owe the world 
an explanation, because your child’s face is what it is – the face her mother loves. And no 
mom ever needs to explain that. (COCA 2007 MAG Parenting)
The very fact that the mother asks how to respond to questions about her baby’s birthmark signals
some social concern, possibly rooted in taboo, in discussing a big birthmark in her baby’s face. The
person answering the question then hints that such communication may be face-threatening to the
mother  by  suggesting  that  her  friends’  politeness  might  prevent  them  from  mentioning  the
birthmark.
Ultimately,  our covarying collexeme analysis of lexemes coattracted to  polite in the [too
ADJ to V]-construction provides us with an idea of the types of actions to be avoided in accordance
with the cultural model of POLITENESS.
4.3 [Too busy to V] and cultural models of BEING BUSY
As with  POLITENESS,  the state of  BEING BUSY also causes an individual to avoid certain types of
situations.  Of  course,  the  circumstances  are  rather  different.  While  POLITENESS has  to  do  with
avoidance of situations in the name of saving face or avoiding taboo, BEING BUSY leads to avoidance
of situations which the person in question does not have the time to get involved in. In other words,
the person in question will have to prioritize some situations and deprioritize others. Investigating
the  collexemes  coattracted  to  busy in  the  [too ADJ  to V]-construction  in  COCA may  reveal
underlying conceptual patterns pertaining to the cultural perception in American culture of the types
of situations which are typically deprioritized. Table 3 provides a list of collexemes coattracted to
busy in the [too ADJ to V]-construction:
Among the lexical items on the list, we find a number of verbs of HUMAN INTERACTION, such as talk,
attend,  chat,  answer,  meet,  visit,  hang,  discuss,  speak,  and  play.  Below  are  three  illustrative
examples from the corpus:
(16) Why does the sign say Two Cats Company? I only see one. “It’s too busy to talk. Let’s get 
to work,” I said. (COCA 1991 FIC VirginiaQRev)
(17) You might be referred to a hospital for treatment in an emergency or when you’re ill, due 
to the possibility that your physician may be too busy to see you himself. (COCA 2007 
MAG Prevention)
(18) I will write them and say you’re too busy to visit this summer. Agreed? (COCA 1990 FIC 
Ploughshares)
As we see in examples (16-18), the construction sets up scenarios in which two people (and a cat)
are construed as being so busy that they are prevented partaking in the situation expressed by the
infinitive clauses associated with the V-position, thus causing the situations not to happen. The list
of collexemes in table 3 suggests that, in an American context, among the typically deprioritized
situations we find that activities of human communication,  interaction,  and social  company are
prominent.
Thus, if there is indeed an American cultural model of  BEING BUSY, we can assume that it
includes  various  types  of  HUMAN INTERACTION as  a  category,  or  maybe  a  set  of  categories,  of
deprioritized situations. In other words, if the hypothesis of an underlying cultural model of BEING
BUSY is verifiable, we can assume that social life is generally deprioritized – and deprioritizing it
might even be sanctioned – in that model.
5. The role of co-text and the current discourse space
We have seen  that  the  semantic  relations  among coattracted  items  in  the  construction  may be
indicative of underlying cultural models. However, in virtually all of the examples listed throughout
this paper, we see that there are cues in the immediate discursive context which may also evoke or
specify the cultural model in question, or at least an element within it.  We may assume that in
canonical discourse situations, or usage-events, there is thematic coherence between an individual
linguistic unit or constellation, such as a lexical or a constructional instance, and the co-text. Co-text
is defined as “items in the text which accompany the item under discussion” Catford (1965: 31fn2).
This  thematic  coherence  may lie  in  the cultural  model  being activated – either  by cues  in  the
preceding  co-text  or  the  instance  of  the  construction  (or,  of  course,  various  extralinguistic
contextual factors) – in the current discourse space. Langacker defines the current discourse space
(2001: 144) as “the mental space comprising those elements and relations construed as being shared
by  the  speaker  and  hearer  as  a  basis  for  communication  at  a  given  moment  in  the  flow  of
discourse.” Consequently, in analyzing the emergence, or reflection, of cultural models in verbal
behavior, it is important to also take into consideration the co-text, because the co-text may provide
cues that activate underlying cultural models or specify elements within such models.
Ideally,  co-textual  features  indicative  of  cultural  models  should  be  operationalized  and
quantified such that potential patterns may be identified. However, this would be a considerably
time-consuming  affair.  Consequently,  in  this  paper,  only  three  examples  will  be  subject  to
qualitative analysis for illustrative purposes. For the sake of simplicity and clarity, the discussion is
limited to [too young to V]:
(19) They called them crazy when they started out. Said, “Seventeen’s too young to know what 
love’s about.” (COCA 2011 SPOK NBC_TODAY)
In this particular usage-event, which is part of the lyrics of a love song entitled “Love Like Crazy”,
we encounter the hypothesized [too young to VCOGNITION]-schema. There are a number of elements in
the co-text of the instance of the schema that activate cognitive models in the current discourse
space which are in interplay with too young to know. Firstly, the title, which the speaker mentions in
a brief introduction of the song before he starts to recite it,  evokes in the listener the cognitive
model of LOVE (Steen 2003). Secondly, a scenario is set up in which a group of antagonists, using
the [too young to VCOGNITION]-schema, negatively evaluate protagonists’ mutual romantic interest by
imposing  a  preventive  force-dynamic  relation  between  the  protagonists’  YOUNG AGE and  their
knowledge about love. Thus, we can assume a conceptual connection between the cognitive model
of  LOVE (which  is  likely  to  be  a  culturally  specific  one)  and  the  culturally  perceived  relation
between YOUNG AGE and  LIMITED INTELLECTUAL CAPACITY. It may indeed be the case that there are
age-specifications  and  associated  force-dynamic  relations  associated  with  the  model  of  LOVE.
Thirdly, by mentioning that the protagonists are seventeen years old, the song specifies, to some
extent, the age that constitutes the degree of  YOUNGNESS at which knowledge of love is not to be
expected.
The following example is similar in some ways:
(20) This couldn’t be happening. Amanda was much too young to die. Why, she was only 16!
(COCA 2001 FIC Listen)
As with (19),  the age that  specifies the high degree of  YOUNGNESS is  specified.  In this  case,  a
worldview emerges in which being sixteen years old is not an appropriate age to die at, and thus a
negated preventive relation is set up. Prior to the three sentences in (20), the narrator has been
informed by her father that her cousin Amanda had been killed. Unlike (19), of course, the age
specification is located in the subsequent co-text, so there are differences in terms of the order of
activation and specification of concepts in the current discourse space. Note that the underlying
worldview seems to be assigned a commonsensical status in the narrator’s exclamation, presenting
an argument in which the discrepancy between being sixteen years old and dying is construed as a
taken-for-granted  objective  truth.  In  a  similar  fashion,  the  antagonists  in  (19)  present  the
discrepancy between being seventeen years old and knowing about love as commonsensical. As
mentioned earlier Quinn & Holland (1987: 4) point out that cultural models are taken for granted by
members of the community in question.
6. Concluding remarks
We  set  out  to  investigate  the  possibility  of  the  discursive  behavior  of  the  [too ADJ  to V]-
construction reflecting underlying cultural models.
Cultural  models  are  schematic  cognitive models  that  are  intersubjectively shared  by the
members  of  a  community,  which  guide  its  members’ understanding of  the  world  and people’s
behavior; it also mediates and regulates the behavior of the community members. Cultural models
are based on universal cognitive principles, but are culture-specific, but their specifics are culture-
specific. Given that they are behavior-mediating and –regulating, we can assume that underlying
cultural models surface in behavior, including verbal behavior. Thus, analysis of corpus data may, in
addition to patterns in verbal behavior itself, reveal emergent cultural models.
Our  primary  method  of  analysis  is  covarying  collexeme  analysis,  which  allows  us  to
measure  the  degree  of  coattraction  among  the  lexemes  that  appear  in  two  positions  in  a
construction. Given the principle of semantic coherence (Stefanowitsch & Gries 2005: 11), we can
assume that the semantic relations in coattracted collexeme pairs are reflective of the constructional
semantic  relations  between  the  two  positions.  There  is  an  implied  force-dynamic  relation  of
PREVENTION,  ultimately  based  on  BLOCKAGE (Johnson  1987:  45-46),  between  the  ADJ-  and  V-
positions.  Covarying  collexeme  analysis  reveals  that  the  construction  is  used  to  express  both
‘natural’, force-dynamic relations of prevention and culturally filtered ones. The culturally filtered
relations are held to be reflective of force-dynamic cultural models.
In focusing on [too young to V], [too polite to V], and [too busy to V], we saw several
attraction  patterns  among  their  respective  collexemes  that  suggest  cultural  models  of  force-
dynamics. The fact that young is coattracted to a number of cognitive and evaluative verbs in the
[too ADJ  to V]-construction suggests  a perception of  young age having a  preventive effect  on
cognition, intellect, and morality, while  polite was coattracted to verbs of human interaction and
communication in the construction, indicating that – in certain contexts – acts of communication
may be face-threatening in American culture. Finally, among the verbs coattracted to  busy in the
construction,  we found a  number of  verbs  of  interaction,  communication,  and human sociality,
suggesting that, in American culture, there may be a tendency to deprioritize social situations when
one is busy. Our brief discussion of co-texts and current discourse spaces additionally seems to
support the tenet in cognitive anthropology that people draw on the commonsensical perception of
cultural models as a means to aid them in evaluation of people and situations as well as in decision-
making.
I think we can rather safely argue that the [too ADJ to V]-construction may indeed be used
to express underlying cultural models of PREVENTION. The question that this raises is whether or not
our covarying collexeme analysis reveals the cultural models in their entirety. The answer must be
that we have only inferred parts of the cultural models of AGE,  POLITENESS, and BEING BUSY in our
covarying collexeme analysis. Our brief discussion of the role of discourse spaces shows that taking
into  account  co-text  is  important,  and  I  would  suggest  that  methods  of  operationalization  and
quantification of so-textual cues should be developed in the future.  Ultimately,  corpus data and
methodology are useful in the identification and analysis of the reflection of cultural models in
verbal behavior, and it is worth considering adding corpus methodology to the arsenal of methods
already used in the study of cultural models in cognitive anthropology and cognitive linguistics, so
as to establish an empirically strong triangulatory methodological apparatus.
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